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The European Parliament elections in 2014 ended in momentous gains 
throughout the continent for several groupings that have explicitly questioned 
the form, and even the very existence, of the European Union (EU) itself. This 
growth in discontentment presents a potentially formidable challenge to the 
integrationist agenda that has hitherto largely prevailed in Brussels. The 
orthodoxy that states could achieve so much more by working closely 
together is now under threat. So it perhaps somewhat paradoxical that what 
are often labelled ‘Euroskeptics’, or self-identify as ‘Eurorealists’, have 
exploited the European Parliament (EP) as a major campaigning platform 
from which to express themselves. Moreover, these parties have achieved 
representation and thereby gained practical resources that have in turn 
helped them further mobilize support within their respective member states. 
Perhaps one of the few comforts for adherents to what was once the 
seemingly hegemonic Europhile consensus that still dominates the Council of 
Ministers and European Commission is that the various skeptical forces 
ranged against them are ideologically divided and agree on little save their 
desire to hasten the end of the Euro, the European Union or both.  
 
Commenting on politics during the mid-1990s Andreas Schedler described the 
then emerging ‘Anti-Political Establishment’ (APE) as a ‘spectre… haunting 
contemporary party politics’ (1996: 291). This phenomenon included the 
developing Eurosceptic forces within EU member states. Since then ‘APE’ 
parties have become an established feature within the EP and it is noteworthy 
that the anti-integrationists have also used this forum to try and influence the 
domestic political agenda in their respective states. The Parliament has 
proved useful in helping these parties gain leverage and representation in 
their countries’ ‘first order’ or governmental elections. Many of these 
politicians share what Schedler characterized as largely right wing affinities 
that provide a rallying point for a melange of disaffected voters, disgruntled 
conservatives, overt nationalists and covert racists (ibid.).  
 The 2007-8 economic crises provided an obvious opportunity for APE parties. 
The resulting dissatisfaction with incumbent politicians across Europe led to 
the insurgents gaining further support and seats in the 2009 European 
elections. But it was the conclusion of the subsequent campaign in 2014 that 
witnessed even more significant breakthroughs by the various Euroskeptic 
groupings. Cumulatively these parties offer a potentially strong, sustained 
alternative to the integrationist narrative that has hitherto informed much EU 
debate. The once self-assured Christian Democrat, Socialist and Liberal 
parties that helped create the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
subsequently dominated successive parliamentary elections now face a major 
existential threat of the kind they have not previously experienced. This 
chapter will consider the source of this challenge through exploring the 
messages produced and disseminated by the various skeptical parties during 
the 2014 elections, specifically through examination of their own political 
advertisements. To that end, this chapter draws on the data collected in the 
international project European Election Campaign 2014, in which researchers 
from all 28 EU member states participated. The aim of this project was to 
collate all available offline campaign material of the 2014 European 
Parliamentary elections, which the eligible parties and their front-runners 
published. Analysis of these kinds of campaign is important because it offer 
insights into how more radical politicians, unencumbered by the need to 
mediate via the mainstream news, communicate their case to electorates on 
their own terms.  
 
The primary focus of this chapter is on parties that have been labeled as 
‘radical right’. Critically they have made political and electoral progress over 
the last decade but have been unable to sustain themselves as a cohesive, 
unified presence within the EP. Consequently, aside from the mainstream 
European Peoples’ Party (EPP) and its more ‘Eurorealistic’ rivals in the British 
dominated European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) grouping, the right 
is present in three more factions within the parliament. The rise to prominence 
and 2014 campaigns by leading members of each of these tendencies will be 
discussed in turn, starting with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a 
prominent part of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) which 
succeeded the similarly named European Alliance for Freedom in 2015. 
Although not the largest member of the EFN, the FPÖ has established itself 
as one of the most influential forces in it as well as the radical right more 
generally. The controversy that has dogged the party and its fellow Alliance 
members encouraged the formation of a rival Euroskeptic grouping, the 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). This EFDD was co-
created by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) which also 
dominates the faction and whose campaign will be analyzed in greater depth. 
The third manifestation of the radical right within the EP, represented here by 
the Hungarian nationalist Jobbik, has proven too extreme for either 
aforementioned skeptical grouping. It nonetheless represents a constituency 
that has support both domestically and elsewhere within the EU. But before 
turning to consider these radical right campaigns in more depth it is important 
and useful to acknowledge and reflect upon the other major source of 
skepticism towards the EU project. This has come from the left and 
represents an, at times, populist tradition of dissent that has been overlooked 
in recent years due in part to the more flamboyant activities of its counterparts 
on the opposite side of the political spectrum.  
 
‘Euroskepticism’: left as well as right 
Originally the most potent opposition to European integration came from 
radical voices on the left who critiqued the formation of a ‘common market’ in 
the guise of an EEC dedicated to furthering what they denounced as a more 
laissez faire capitalist economy (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008). There were still 
vestiges of this argument in advertisements produced for the 2014 EU 
elections. The Greek Communist KKE, for instance, depicted then Prime 
Minister Samaras and European Commission President Barroso embracing in 
what it portrayed as attempts to dupe the public on behalf of a menacing EU 
symbolized by a hungry wolf. The detrimental consequences of Greece 
remaining in the Union also informed the campaign imagery of ANTARSYA, 
another revolutionary leftist group contesting the elections in a country 
convulsed by economic problems. Their TV spot featured representatives of 
the nation’s youth tied, gagged and desperately needing to escape Brussels’ 
control. Similar sentiments informed a televised spot from the French 
Trotskyite Lutte Ouvriere in which leader Nathalie Arthaud talked about the 
failure of the EU in the context of a systemic crisis of capitalism. This theme 
was taken up by the German Communist KPD in a campaign broadcast that 
attacked the imposition of austerity on member states by a Union it 
denounced as an ‘instrument of the banks and big business’ (‘EU- instrument 
der Banken und Konzern’).  
 
The populist critiques of EU economic policies by the KKE formed part of a 
campaign that culminated in them gaining EP representation but their more 
traditional form of communism lacks wider support across the continent. The 
party’s trenchant positions have led to its isolation from erstwhile allies within 
the Assembly in the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL). A 
common thread in campaigning by those in the EUL-NGL has been advocacy 
of a radical though reformist platform devoted to working within the Union to 
create a more ‘social’ Europe. Some of this rhetoric nonetheless resembled 
that of the more traditional Communists with Germany’s Die Linke attacking 
bankers ‘No tax money for gambling banks!’ (‘Keine Steuergelder für 
Zockerbanken’), the French Front de Gauche denouncing austerity with ‘Stop 
A L’Europe De La Finance: l’humain d’abord’ and the new radical Spanish 
formation, in the guise of leader Pablo Iglesias and other supporters, 
promoting themselves as being on the side of the people against the 
mainstream elites declaring ‘Podemos of course!’ (‘¡Claro que podemos!’). 
SYRIZA adopted a comparable approach in a poster, ‘On May 25th we vote, 
they leave’, that depicted the then Prime Minister Samaras alongside 
Chancellor Merkel as co-conspirators against the Greek public. The Dutch 
Socialists, another GUE-NGL affiliate, used cartoons to historicize and identify 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as the culprits behind the neo-liberal 
orthodoxy they hold responsible for the contemporary economic crisis. 
 
The portrayals of Merkel, Barroso and others associated with the so-called 
Troika and its sponsorship of austerity in some of the Left campaigns’ publicity 
was not intended to provoke national prejudice against foreign politicians. 
Rather their inclusion was designed to foster internationalism and solidarity 
across borders. Within the EUL-NGL the Pirate Party perhaps best embodies 
this spirit of pan-European co-operation with candidates in several member 
states campaigning against state surveillance and online censorship. Yet 
despite their idiosyncratic, left-libertarian origins, the Pirates’ televised 
appeals in countries like France, Germany and the Czech Republic were 
relatively conventional in featuring earnest and youthful spokespeople talking 
about issues. The same could also be said of the Greens who, by definition of 
their environmentalism, are driven by concerns that transcend narrow national 
considerations. Consequently, and perhaps predictably, a fair amount of these 
parties’ advertising dealt with the perennial concern over that state of the 
continental not to mention the global ecological situation. For instance, Verdi, 
the Italian affiliate, adopted the slogan ‘Per Un Europa Green’ on its poster. 
 
The Left did not have a monopoly in terms of highlighting and campaigning 
against the various alleged deficiencies of the EU. Some of the rhetoric and 
style of advertising used by others was similarly populist at times but nothing 
was as outrageous as the efforts of Germany’s Die Partei, the ultimate ‘anti-
politics’ organisation. This eccentric ‘party’ devised a campaign devoted to 
mocking its rivals in television spots including one featuring a bizarre sketch 
involving a couple in a bathroom reading ‘leader’ Martin Sonneborn’s Titanic 
magazine. Continuing with the ‘post-modern’ humour another feature took the 
form of an out of focus pornographic film contrived to provoke a reaction. 
Sonneborn was subsequently elected to the European Parliament where he 
has been involved in various stunts including declaring himself a skeptic, but 
only on the specific issue of Britain’s continuing membership. If nothing else 
this highlighted the salience of an issue that has been foregrounded by the 
UK’s Conservatives and which led to them breaking with the EPP following a 
pledge by David Cameron during his successful run for his party’s leadership 
in 2005. Cameron subsequently helped create the more ‘Eurorealist’ ECR 
which currently includes the ruling Polish Law and Justice party (PiS), the 
relatively new Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Danish’s People’s Party 
(DF), a group somewhat less radical than its forerunners. Although critical of 
the EU, these parties’ adverts tended to be comparatively sober when 
considered alongside the campaign rhetoric of the rival factions on the right. 
The AfD, for instance, produced a conventional campaign broadcast featuring 
various representatives of key voter demographics questioning Germany’s 
involvement in the EU due to transport, energy and other policies. 
 
 
Desperately seeking respectability? The Freedom Party of Austria and 
the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group. 
In the European Parliament, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) was a 
member of the European Alliance for Freedom from 2010 to 2015 and joined 
the newly founded Europe of Nations and Freedom in 2015 together with 
other European right-wing populist parties such as France’s National Front, 
Italy’s Northern League or Netherlands’ party for Freedom.  The FPÖ came 
third in the 2014 European Elections receiving 19.7 percent of the vote, 
thereby confirming itself as an influential political force in domestic as well as 
European politics.i The current FPÖ Chairman Heinz-Christian Strache has 
succeeded in establishing his media profile and consolidating that of his party, 
following the pioneering work of predecessor Jörg Haider. Strache, like Haider, 
has used populist rhetoric to capitalize on what they perceive to be a section 
of the Austrian ‘people’s’ resentment towards the political ‘elite’ and the status 
quo (Plasser & Ulram 2000; Pelinka 2002; Pelinka 2005). This is perhaps not 
surprising given the party was formed by a former Nazi politician during the 
mid-1950s before coming to wider prominence in the 1980s. During this 
period Haider proved a divisive though nonetheless successful figure through 
his use of anti-Semitic and xenophobic sentiments to garner members as well 
as votes for the FPÖ. Following the passage of the markedly more 
integrationist Single European Act, the party moved to exploit increasing 
resentment towards Brussels. Consequently, in 1993 Haider launched the 
“Austria First!” initiative, a campaign that involved the collection of signatures 
to force a referendum demanding further restrictions on immigration.  
 
In 1999 the FPÖ’s won 26.9 per cent in national elections and formed a 
coalition government with the hitherto dominant centre-right People’s Party. 
The party’s subsequent involvement in the ruling administration led to Austria 
becoming something of an international pariah, particularly among fellow EU 
members states. One consequence of this adverse reaction was the sidelining 
of Haider who did not take up a ministerial position and stood down as FPÖ 
Chairman. During the subsequent period in government the party lost support 
despite, or perhaps because, it trying to present itself as a responsible force in 
government. The 2002 election saw a fall in FPÖ support but the return of the 
same coalition to office for a second term. This return to government resulted 
in a further loss of support- the party receiving only 6.3 percent of votes in the 
2004 European poll- and a serious split the following year with Haider and 
allies exiting to form a rival Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). 
 
Following the formation of BZÖ, the new FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache 
sought to rejuvenate the party’s fortunes by distancing himself from the anti-
Semitic attitudes associated with the Haider era. Rather Strache tried to 
exploit and reinforce a growth in Islamophobia as well as public fears over 
crime and immigration (Fallend 2004; McGann & Kitschelt 2005; Luther 2007; 
Krzyżanowsky 2013). Appeals to patriotism replaced Haider’s more nakedly 
nationalistic rhetoric as the FPÖ placed greater emphasis on preserving 
indigenous Austrian culture, so-called “Heimat”, as well as national 
sovereignty against an encroachment from migrants entering the country and 
the European Union institutions without. Strache’s freedom to exploit these 
themes and promote Islamophobia was made easier following his party’s exit 
from government in 2007 (Frölich-Steffen 2004; Krzyżanowsky 2013).  
 
The immigration issue has helped and continues to define Strache’s FPÖ 
against its centre-right and centre-left domestic ‘establishment’ rivals. 
Campaigns reiterate the need to monitor and regulate migrants and those 
seeking asylum, movements that have both been made easier by EU wide 
initiatives. Thus the FPÖ identifies with and seeks to preserve “Heimat” 
against what it warns is a threat from alien cultures, notably Islam. In doing so 
the party promotes an authoritarian image designed to emphasize and 
reinforce its reputation as a strong political force dedicated to preserving 
Austria as a Christian country (Frölich-Steffen 2004; Meret 2010). Initially the 
FPÖ supported Austria joining the European Community believing 
membership could help reinforce and sustain the country’s national identity. 
But this changed, particularly with the replacement of the Austrian currency by 
the Euro in 1998, although the party anti-integrationist rhetoric was stymied by 
its participation in government from 2000 to 2007. The subsequent return to 
opposition emboldened Strache and his colleagues to increasingly attack the 
EU as a threat to national sovereignty (Frölich-Steffen 2004; Meret 2010).  
 
During the 2014 European election the FPÖ issued 22 different posters in four 
alternative styles. In a highly personalized campaign, 18 of these adverts 
featured politicians and eight the face of leader Heinz-Christian Strache even 
though he was not personally a candidate. The latter was the simplest of the 
poster styles and depicted Strache, the best known party figure, alongside the 
party’s lead election candidate, Harald Vilismky, in three posed images. 
Another series used the same images accompanied by what were designed 
to be eye catching slogans, the latter in bullet point form to emphasize key 
aspects of the party’s electoral programme. The third set used the slogans 
rather than the leaders’ images. Finally, the remaining posters, ten in total, 
were used to introduce the party’s EP candidates by placing names to their 
respective photographs, thereby hoping to familiarize them to the electorate. 
Each of the four series shared common features. The Austrian and European 
Union flags were reproduced at the bottom of every poster and reference 
made to the former’s colours in the slogan ‘Team red-white-red’ that appeared 
beneath the FPÖ logo. The advertisements were all emblazoned with a yellow 
badge complete with cross representing the act of voting. With one exception 
this particular element of the design featured the message: ‘Warning for the 
EU and red-black’. Whereas the ‘red’ referred to the rival Social Democrats 
and ‘black’ to the centre-right People’s Party, mention of the EU was designed 
to highlight the FPÖ’s critical stance on Austrian membership and also the 
more integrationist policies of these rivals. The exceptional message 
underlined this point with the declaration ‘We make Austria strong!’, a clear 
attempt to position the party as the supposed upholder of national culture and 
tradition. 
 
The party traditionally relies on catchy populist sloganeering to promote its 
message. During the 2006 national campaign, for instance, the chosen theme 
was ‘Daham statt Islam’ (‘Homeland instead of Islam’) whereas in the 
subsequent 2009 European elections a similar sentiment was expressed 
using the different words ‘Abendland in Christenhand’ (‘The Occident in 
Christian hands’). In 2014 one of the most prominent posters was ‘Österreich 
denkt um. Zu viel EU ist dumm’ (‘Austria rethinks. Too much EU is silly’) which, 
although a change from the aforementioned campaign themes, incorporated 
the party’s fondness for using rhyming words in its sloganeering. ‘Dumm’ 
aspects criticized included the ‘travelling circus’ whereby European institutions 
were located in three separate locations requiring decision-makers to 
constantly move between them to get anything done. The rhyming device was 
also used in another advert criticizing Austrian membership of the Union: ‘Wir 
verstehen eure Wut. Zu viel EU tut niemand gut.‘ (‘We understand your rage. 
Too much EU is not good.’). The use of pronouns ‘we’ and ‘you’ along with the 
country’s name and flag – both also deployed here – are familiar tropes 
associated with ‘patriotic’ commentators including nationalistic politicians.By 
using them the FPÖ sought to position itself as the party opposed to a 
bureaucratic and predatory EU and more implicitly those rival parties who 
were prepared to acquiesce to its power and influence.  
 
The FPÖ promoted its Euroskeptical credentials through campaigning for a 
referendum on the European Stability Mechanism whereby those countries 
using the Euro were obliged to contribute funds to assuage the burden of 
heavily indebted states. The party suggested the crisis within the Eurozone 
was a problem of endemic corruption and a bankrupt system and for which 
Austrians should be not liable. This was linked to claims that the rival parties’ 
economic policies had failed, particularly in relation to a banking sector which 
posters also excoriated. Moreover, the FPÖ called for the abandonment of the 
Euro and the reinstatement of indigenous currencies as a precursor to any 
sustained financial recovery. This was a key aspect in a platform of economic 
nationalism that called for Austrian cessation from labour and agricultural EU 
agreements. The party also made clear its opposition to free trade of a more 
global nature and this isolationism extended to its decidedly neutralist stance 
on foreign policy. 
 
Criticism of the EU as an unwieldy bureaucracy was a, if not, the major theme 
of the FPÖ’s election campaign in 2014 (Table 1). Underpinning this was a 
fear of cultural diversity and political independence being ceded within a more 
integrated United States of Europe. Several slogans articulated various 
grievances about the threat of Brussels encroachment into various aspects of 
Austrian law through means of surveillance and data retention (Table 2). The 
party pressed its anti-integrationist case by demanding another referendum 
on the country’s membership of the Schengen area as part of an agreement 
guaranteeing free movement of people within the Union. Linked to this were 
concerns about the possibility of Turkey’s future accession into the EU which 
the FPÖ firmly rejected. The party has long been a critic of migration within 
the Union and its allegedly negative cultural as well as economic 
consequences for Austria. A particular concern has been with the supposed 
threat from Eastern Europeans to indigenous workers’ employment security, 
pay and conditions through their undermining existing minimum wage levels 
and pension entitlements. Allied to this the party argued for more stringent 
enforcement of the Dublin Regulation whereby asylum seekers, who the FPÖ 
has associated with increased criminality, are required to stay in their country 
of entry when arriving within the EU. Clearly the implementation or not of this 
policy had ramifications for a land locked country such as Austria. 
 
Table 1: Targets of negative attacks in campaign posters 
 FPÖ UKIP Jobbik 
 % 
% % 
Foreign Countries 0.0 10.0 0.0 
EU Institutions / Government 45.5 20.0 0.0 
Foreign / European Politicians 4.5 80.0 0.0 
National Politicians 4.5 10.0 0.0 
Political institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Economic institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Number of posters being issued during EU election campaign:  
FPÖ: N = 22, UKIP: N = 10, Jobbik: N = 3 
 
 
In to get out: UKIP and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 
Group  
The United Kingdom Independence Party were said to have ‘won’ the 2014 
European elections in the UK by coming top of the poll with 26.8 percent of 
votes and 24 MEPs. This was the first time in a century that neither of the 
major two parties, Labour and Conservative, had received the largest support 
in a nationwide electoral contest. It was a remarkable feat for an organization 
that was founded in the early 1990s and that David Cameron had once 
dismissed as ‘fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists, mostly’.ii Cameron could 
not have expected that his dismissive remarks would return to haunt him 
years later when, under pressure from UKIP going into the 2015 General 
Election, he committed his government to holding a referendum on UK 
membership of the EU by 2017 in the event of a Conservative victory.  The 
fateful vote took place in June 2016 and resulted in a narrow victory in favour 
of British exit, so-called ‘Brexit’ (Jackson et al., 2016).  Cameron had belatedly 
embraced the cause of the EU during a referendum he had called but 
ultimately he failed against a determined alliance of campaigners that 
included UKIP and its leader Nigel Farage. 
 
Historically British politicians critical of the EU had tried to mobilize within the 
major parties, both of which were split over the 1975 referendum held to 
confirm UK membership of the then EEC. Since then Euroskeptics have 
become frustrated by what they perceive as a threat to British sovereignty 
from Brussels (Baker & Seawright, 1998). Following the passing of the Single 
European Act the self-styled ‘anti-federalists’ broke away from existing 
parties, notably the Conservatives, to form their own campaigning 
organizations and to contemplate fighting elections. As already noted David 
Cameron sought to counter this threat by forming the ECR grouping within the 
EP in order to distance his party from the Europhile EPP during the run up to 
the won signing of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Conservative involvement in the 
ECR has not, however, succeeded in curtailing the rise of UKIP.  
 
Initially UKIP was not the most significant anti-EU political force and trailed in 
well behind the rival anti-EU Referendum Party in the 1997 UK General 
Election. Since then it has steadily gained support and, more crucially, 
representation in the European Parliament having campaigned strongly 
against British membership of the Euro, a possibility that was seriously 
considered in 2003 by the then electorally dominant Labour government led 
by Tony Blair. iii  The salience of such issues combined with significant 
modifications to the conduct of the British poll for the European Parliament 
provided UKIP with a major opportunity to promote its agenda (Ford and 
Goodwin, 2014). Whereas UK ‘first order’ elections use a majoritarian ‘first 
past the post’ system, the voting for EP representatives now takes a 
proportional form that has encouraged the rise of smaller parties. UKIP has 
benefitted from this arrangement introduced for the 1999 poll in which it won 3 
MEPs. The subsequent elections in 2004 saw a major breakthrough for the 
party with the return of 12 MEPs, a position consolidated in the subsequent 
poll of 2009 (Ford et al., 2011 ; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). Since then UKIP 
has won seats in local government but has struggled to gain representation at 
Westminster where it has only one MP despite receiving 12.7 percent of the 
vote in the 2015 General Election. This was a striking contrast to a 2014 
European campaign that, by definition, foregrounded UKIP’s raison d’etre and 
also experienced far lower levels of voter turnout.  
 
The steady rise of UKIP reflects the enduring controversy surrounding the 
European Union. The recent crisis involving member states, notably Greece, 
has done little to stem the intensity of debate over Britain’s relationship with its 
EU partners. UKIP’s rapid growth has presented the organization with threats 
as well as opportunities. Since it was formed there have been high profile 
fallouts, defections and embarrassments involving major figures including 
some of its elected members. These have included at least three acting or 
actual leaders who have left UKIP in acrimony. However, since 2006 the party 
has been led by Nigel Farage for all but a brief interregnum when he tried to 
win a Westminster parliamentary seat in the 2010 general election. During this 
time, he has established a strong media profile for himself in a way that 
eluded his predecessors. Farage has been keen to promote himself and UKIP 
as the scourge of a Westminster ‘establishment’ that is allegedly out of touch 
with the British public on Europe as well as many other issues (Lynch et al., 
2012). The 2014 campaign proved the ideal platform to demonstrate the 
party’s electoral potency.  
 
UKIP entered the 2014 campaign in a strong position courtesy of financial 
backing from wealthy supporters such as the former Conservative donor 
Stuart Wheeler. This enabled the party to mount the kind of outdoor 
advertising effort normally seen only during a national election. Key themes in 
the poster campaign were Brussels’ challenge to UK sovereignty, the risk EU 
membership posed to British workers and related but more specific critiques 
of the EU (Table 1 and Table 2). Each image was emblazoned with the party’s 
purple and yellow colours, its pound sterling motif inscribed with its name, and 
the slogan urging the public to vote for UKIP in order to ‘Take Back Control of 
Our Country’. A poster posing the question ‘Who really runs this country?’ 
provided the answer ‘75% of our laws are now made in Brussels’. This was 
accompanied by the striking image of the UK’s flag burning from the centre to 
reveal the EU logo beneath.  
 
During the final week of the campaign the answer was reissued with the 
revised question ‘Who really runs Westminster?’ and an image of Big Ben, the 
UK parliament’s tower, with the clock face showing the EU flag. This followed 
logically on from an earlier poster ‘Nigel Farage will give Britain its voice back’ 
depicting him alongside the four main party leaders but as the only one 
without a gag around his mouth. Criticism of these three political rivals was 
evident in other UKIP outdoor advertising proclaiming ‘LibLabCon MEPs are 
jolly junketeers’ with a photograph of a casually dressed middle-aged man 
straddling a plane looking as though he were going on holiday. It was striking 
that there was no justification of the claim that these politicians were indulging 
themselves at a cost to the public. This was due to ongoing hostility towards 
mainstream politicians following revelations in 2009 about political expenses 
involving members of the three major parties represented at Westminster. The 
critique of the supposedly corrupt political elite extended to Brussels. Another 
poster contrasted a photograph of members of the general public travelling on 
a bus, labeled, ‘Your daily grind…’ and with the UK flag, with another of a 
suited, late middle-aged male actor sitting posing in the back of an expensive 
limousine. The latter image, accompanied by the EU logo, was captioned ‘… 
funds his celebrity lifestyle’ and subtitled ‘The UK pays £55 million a day to 
the EU and its Eurocrats’.  
 
 
Table 2: Political issues being mentioned in campaign posters (multiple 
responses possible) 
 FPÖ UKIP Jobbik 
 % % % 
Labour 9.1% 20.0% 0.0% 
Unemployment 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Salaries 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Taxes 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Other Economic issues 0.0% 30.0% 66.7% 
Euro policies 13.6% 10.0% 33.3% 
EU politicians members 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Euro finance 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Anti-Euro 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Euro banks 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Euro funds 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Euro institutions 4.5% 40.0% 0.0% 
Euro taxes 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 
European Union 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
Other European issues 4.5% 0.0% 33.3% 
Crime 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Corruption 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Social services 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Other welfare issues 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Civil rights 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 
Traditions 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Anti-Politics 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Agriculture 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Autonomy / Federalism 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 
Peace 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Immigration 4.5% 20.0% 0.0% 
Other issues 77.3% 10.0% 0.0% 
Note: Number of posters being issued during EU election campaign:  
FPÖ: N = 22, UKIP: N = 10, Jobbik: N = 3 
 
 
UKIP made criticisms of particular policies it claimed were now Brussels’ 
responsibility. These included the perennial issue of immigration. A poster 
depicting the white cliffs near Dover, the English town nearest to continental 
Europe, was doctored to show an escalator providing access up this normally 
inaccessible landmark. The image was explained by the slogan ‘No border. 
No control.’. A subtitle explained: ‘The EU has opened our borders to 4,000 
people every week’. Once again no supporting reference was given for the 
graphic figures. The potential ‘threat’ to the job market was made explicit in 
another advert: ‘EU policy at work. British workers are hit hard by unlimited 
cheap labour’. The poster attracted controversy when it was subsequently 
revealed the man featured to represent an ordinary worker was Irish rather 
than from the UK. Another – more simple – image of a hand pointing towards 
the viewer reinforced the message about employment: ’26 million people in 
Europe are looking for work. And whose jobs are they after?’.  
 
 
Radical isolation: Jobbik and the Non-Aligned Far-right 
Jobbik is the pre-eminent far party represented within the European Union 
due to recent successes in recent Hungarian as well as EP elections. This is 
in contrast to erstwhile allies from other member states who have either lost 
support or else moderated their stances. By contrast Jobbik, that is the 
‘Movement for Better Hungary’, has toned down some of its rhetoric but 
remains wedded to an ideological perspective that has left it isolated in the 
newly elected European Parliament. Although the EAF and EFDD groupings 
share the Hungarian party’s concerns about immigration, the latter’s platform 
has proven too extreme for membership of either alliance. Jobbik was 
formerly part of the Alliance of European National Movements but has been 
unable to forge a similar grouping following the 2014 elections, which saw a 
collapse in support for former allies such as the British National Party. To 
understand why this Hungarian party has been able to consolidate its position 
within the EP it is important to consider the background to this particular 
phenomenon. 
 
The modern far-right came to prominence in Hungary when the Justice and 
Life Party (MIÉP) was founded in 1993 by the politicians who left the more 
mainstream conservative Democratic Forum after disagreements during the 
latter’s spell in government. By 1998 MIÉP had gained parliamentary 
representation within the National Assembly with 5.5 percent of the vote 
although it lost this in subsequent elections in 2002 when its support fell to 4.4 
percent. The party developed its profile through reviving rhetoric previously 
associated with the inter-war years and country’s authoritarian past: 
nationalistic, chauvinistic, anti-liberal and anti-communist. Party campaigns 
articulated these as well as racist and social Darwinist ideologies, combining 
them with populist appeals and slogans that promised a new and fairer order 
(Tóth & Grajczár 2009: 9-10). Despite MIÉP’s brief period of electoral success 
and subsequent decline, the grievances it sought to articulate were still 
apparent in Hungarian political culture. This was also part of a wider 
phenomenon whereby public dissatisfaction with the democratic process had 
led to protest voting by certain groups who felt marginalized by the major 
established parties in government (Van den Burg et al. 2000). This sentiment 
has been particularly noticeable in Hungary where MIÉP and subsequently 
Jobbik have mobilized resentment against minority groups that are 
stereotyped through the use of nationalist and populist rhetoric (Tóth & 
Grajczár 2009: 22). Unsurprisingly, MIÉP and Jobbik fought the 2006 national 
elections in alliance although they were unsuccessful in making the electoral 
threshold necessary to gain parliamentary representation. 
 
Jobbik have exploited resentments that the MIÉP originally sought to address 
but has done by attracting younger activists with more professional, modern 
campaigning (Tóth & Grajczjár 2012; Hajdú 2014). This approach involves 
traditional media such as the party’s own weekly paper Barikád as well as 
newer platforms including a news portal called alfahir.hu, the internet site 
jobbik.hu, and an unofficial portal known as kuruc.info that collectively enable 
the party to reach potential supporters (Bársony et al. 2011). These actions 
involve a concerted attempt to mobilize voters, whether they be in urban or 
more rural communities, against what is portrayed as an out of touch 
metropolitan elite. The economic downturn has been a source of increasing 
social tension, uncertainty as well as growing unemployment in both the 
countryside and cities. Jobbik has been critical of recent governments, 
including the previous Socialist (MSZP) and current right-wing incumbent  
Fidesz administrations, for presiding over economic problems and growing 
inequality. The party’s campaigning seeks to capitalize on this through 
combining anti-establishment rhetoric with dire warnings about the threats 
posed by other phenomena, notably the Roma minority, who are routinely 
accused of causing petty crime in urban areas. Equally controversially 
spokespeople have also blamed external minorities, notably international 
Jewry, for their country’s economic woes in comments that have been widely 
condemned.  
 
Jobbik had originally sought to position themselves as guardians of social 
order through forming a paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard. The 
authorities responded by banning the Guard in 2009 but this did not, however, 
diminish the party’s support. In the following year’s national election, it 
reached the necessary electoral threshold to enter parliament, winning 47 
seats and coming second overall in the poll with 16.6 percent of the vote 
ahead of the once ruling MSZP. This success was in part encouraged by the 
party’s performance in European elections that have, as in other member 
states, provided an invaluable opportunity for newer or less well known parties 
like to win support and representation. And whereas the MIÉP’s attempt to 
benefit from the country’s first ever EU poll in 2004 ended in failure, it was the 
following campaign in 2009 that provided a breakthrough for its successor 
party. 
 
The 2009 European elections followed on from a global economic crisis that 
meant it was therefore fought in an environment far less conducive for 
mainstream parties like Democratic Forum and the Socialists who had 
governed Hungary since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Consequently, 
there were breakthroughs for groupings such as the ecologist LMP (‘Politics 
Can Be Different’) as well as the more radical Jobbik (Várnagy 2010: 15). 
Public discontentment translated into protest votes and ultimately ended in the 
election of more non-mainstream MEPs. And, unlike other rival anti-
establishment voices, the party benefitted from clearly stated criticism of an 
increasingly beleaguered EU (Várnagy 2010: 19–20). Jobbik also sought to 
broaden its appeal by endorsing the candidacy of a non-member, the high 
profile lawyer Krisztina Morvai, who it also nominated for the national 
presidency. 
 
Jobbik has campaigned against the encroachment of European Commission 
directives on various issues including the perennial issue of agriculture as well 
as more specific matters such as the right of non-Hungarians to purchase 
property within the country. Consequently, the party’s 2009 campaign slogan, 
‘Creating a Europe of Nations’, was one familiar to others sympathetic to the 
anti-federalist cause. This was the centerpiece of a determined effort that also 
saw the party become the first to gather nominations and publish their 
candidate list. The resulting campaign culminated with Jobbik endorsed 
politicians (including Morvai) winning three EP seats with 14.7 percent. It gave 
the party momentum for the 2010 national elections which, as noted 
previously, saw it make a major breakthrough. The campaign saw Jobbik 
using social media, notably its own unofficial news website kuruc.info, to 
disseminate its message and thereby bypass traditional news channels. 
Fidesz led by Viktor Orbán belatedly realized the threat and began to use 
mainstream media outlets to attack its more radical rivals having previously 
sought to deny them publicity (Kéri 2010: 29, 31–32).  
 
The 2010 campaign saw more vigorous criticisms were of certain Jobbik 
politicians and some were subsequently removed as members. But these 
setbacks did not undermine the party’s standing in the polls. The key Jobbik 
campaign slogan “Twenty Years for Twenty Years” referenced criticisms of 
the status quo’s defence of the corruption, capitalism and Roma communities 
who have been attacked as sources of ‘gypsy crime’ (Jeskó et al. 2012: 82-3). 
There was also the familiar disdain for the ‘establishment’ both left and right 
who were said to have misgoverned the country. The targets of these 
criticisms, the MSZP and Fidesz, tried to rebut their opponents but 
paradoxically drew further attention to their arguments (Bozóki 2010). This 
pattern of engagement continued after the campaign with Jobbik establishing 
itself as an opposition force in parliament as well as the country more 
generally. The party has begun to influence the political agenda in ways 
MIÉP, its predecessor on the far right, never achieved with rival parties taking 
fearful note. 
 
Jobbik’s 2009 and 2010 campaigns provided the party with invaluable political 
experience as well as marked increased in their electoral support. Unlike the 
MIÉP, Jobbik has also had the time and experience to develop its message 
and greater emphasis is placed on economic arguments rather than provoking 
controversy through blaming elites or minority groups for the country’s 
problems. Party leader Gábor Vona underlined his commitment to 
representing ‘small men’ by undertaking ‘ordinary work’ for one day of every 
week throughout the 2014 elections. The European Parliament campaign 
slogan ‘Hungarian economy, European salaries!’ recognized the salience of 
poverty and inequality and the failure of EU membership to ameliorate both. In 
the National Assembly elections, the party’s use of colourful posters and 
videos featuring young people led to it being labelled the ‘Benetton campaign’. 
And although these messages still strongly communicated familiar 
nationalistic themes, the more positive style was different to past efforts and 
certainly those associated with the paramilitary imagery of the Hungarian 
Guard.  
 
Jobbik’s less negative approach to campaigning in 2014 followed a four-year 
term in which it has established itself as a parliamentary force. The party’s 
communication strategy was markedly subtler than that devised in the not too 
distant past and attempted to promote itself as a serious alternative with a 
programme for government rather than as a receptacle for protest votes (see 
Nábelek 2014). Jobbik has already largely succeeded in mobilizing the 
disaffected and nationalistic minded so now campaigning turned to focus on 
demonstrating how the party has emerged as the ‘quiet force’ ready to serve 
(Karácsony & Róna 2010). Sandwiched between national and local elections 
that year, the 2014 European elections provided the party with another 
opportunity to promote its distinctive message. The party received 14.6 
percent of the votes, at 0.1 percent only fractionally less than five years 
earlier, and returned three MEPs. In the parliamentary elections the party did 
even better with 20.2 percent of the poll, some 3.6 percent more than 4 years 
earlier, which won it 23 seats in the new parliament of 199 seats. Significantly, 
this meant Jobbik had become the second largest party in Hungary. 
 
Jobbik’s endorsement of a so-called ‘Europe of Nations’ ideology informed its 
poster slogan ‘European rights, European salaries, in the middle of Europe! 
(Table 2)’. The once more strident anti-EU rhetoric was no longer in evidence 
(Table 1). In its place was a less antagonistic message that the party was 
prepared to engage with others in the spirit of pan-European co-operation. 
Indeed, this approach mirrored campaign advertising by members of the EFN 
and ECR groups in that it maintained a critical position on the EU but one that 
was more open to collaboration rather than straightforward oppositionism. If 
the substance of Jobbik publicity had changed then so had the style. The use 
of Kalocsa patterns together was matched by a more moderate use of the 
Hungarian tricolour. This practice had been earlier adopted in the party’s 
national elections efforts as part of what became known as the so-called 
‘Benetton campaign’, a reference to the knitwear brand’s famously colourful 
marketing. Jobbik proved successful in the 2014 election, reinforcing their 
image as a force that challenges the left as well as the ruling incumbent 
Fidesz.  
 
This same motive could be seen in the end of party’s commercial, the ‘World 
View Eye Test’ was introduced on YouTube, since the Hungarian televisions 
did not air any party commercials during the 2014 elections. In the video a 
man comes for an eye test because he is confused lately, ‘he does not see 
things clearly’. He gets glasses and the doctor asks him to cover his right eye. 
Then we see that on the left lens is the EU flag. He reads out loud from the 
board, former slogans and promises of left-wing parties: ‘More workplace, 
better salaries’, ‘We can open a pastry shop in Vienna’, ‘Agricultural land 
could be bought by foreigners’, and ‘Hungary performs better’, this last was 
the actual slogan of Fidesz. When he cannot read further, the doctor says he 
has ‘orange glaucoma’ (orange is the colour of Fidesz). Then it's his right 
eye's turn. In Hungarian right also means good or correct, and the party's 
name 'Jobbik' is based on this play of words. 'Jobbik' means ‘right’ and also 
‘the better’. We could see the Hungarian flag on the right lens of the glasses. 
With this eye he can see clearly, and reads out loud the ‘under-performance’ 
of former left-wing and actual right-wing governments, which are all negative 
and all have negative effects on everyday lives: ‘Destroyed Hungarian 
economy’, ‘Stolen EU funds’, ‘Sold off Hungarian land’, ‘Adulation in/to 
Brussels’. Now the picture is clear. After a cut, Kisztina Morvai sets out 
Jobbik's promises. 
 
Conclusion 
The 2014 European elections saw the advancement of many different parties 
keen to challenge and even end the European Union as a viable alliance of 
member states.  Advocates for the EU were alarmed by the increasing 
hostility they faced from various groups such as the FPÖ, UKIP and Jobbik 
who have been among the most vocal in their criticisms of Brussels.  Perhaps 
one of the few comforts for the pro-integrationists who still largely dominate 
the European Commission and Council is that their opponents are not as 
cohesive.  Each of the aforementioned three parties, for instance, is allied to a 
different faction within the Parliament and this reflects the very real cultural 
and ideological divisions that exist among the EU’s band of critics.  This 
chapter has explored some of the similarities and differences between those 
groupings on the right of the political spectrum by focusing on the strategic 
messages key opinion-forming parties sought to promote via advertising 
during the 2014 election.  An obvious practical difference in the parties’ 
advertising was the absence of a televised intervention by the FPÖ.  Whereas 
UKIP used its TV ad to make the case for British withdrawal from the EU, 
Jobbik’s commercial focused its efforts on domestic grievances it believed 
many Hungarians fostered against other parties including the governing one.  
Both approaches were nonetheless negative in their tone and content and this 
reflected in various poster promotions deployed during the campaign in all 
three countries.  Inevitably there were also contrasting themes and issues 
presented.   
 
For its part Jobbik was single-minded in having its posters focus on the 
amount of money earned by those working for Brussels.  The FPÖ and UKIP 
attacks were broader in nature although with differences in emphasis whereby 
the former criticised EU policies and the latter the institutional structures.  The 
Union flag was prominent in some of these adverts and its presence was not 
designed to foster affection for an organisation derided as bureaucratic as 
well as unaccountable.  Such arguments were part of the subsequent debate 
in the UK during the recent referendum on the state’s continued membership 
of the EU.  The shock result in favour of Brexit has understandably caused 
consternation across the continent among member states and it remains to be 
seen whether the cumulative weight of efforts by the parties analysed has 
helped embed a more Eurosceptic climate and with it the possibility of more 
drama to come. 
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